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ABSTRACT
Given the practical importance of interpersonal trust in dyadic
negotiations, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to
the study of determinants of trust in negotiations. However,
research in this area has not been well connected or integrated,
which limits the ability of scholars and practitioners to ascertain
the state of current scientific knowledge and identify questions
for future research. Based on attribution theory and social
exchange theory, we present a conceptual framework for
understanding how a variety of factors combine to influence the
development of interpersonal trust in dyadic negotiations. Then,
to verify the conceptual framework, we identified and meta-
analysed findings from a total of 25 independent studies of
determinants of trust in negotiations. The meta-analyses provided
support for two of the three factors in the conceptual framework
– trustor attributes and shared attributes – that are likely to
influence an individual’s trust in a negotiation partner. The
framework and findings provide valuable scientific insights on
trust and negotiation, and also valuable practical insights for
negotiation practitioners.
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In one of the all-time bestselling practitioner books on negotiation, ‘Getting to Yes’, Fisher,
Ury, and Patton (1991) observed that ‘there is power in developing a good working
relationship between the people negotiating’; Fisher et al. further argued that ‘if there is
mutual trust and confidence in one another’s reliability, negotiations are likely to be
smoother and more successful for both parties’ (p. 179). Like practitioners, social and
behavioural scientists have also clearly recognised the importance of interpersonal trust
in the context of dyadic negotiations. For example, Lewicki and Polin (2013) suggested
that ‘trust is a critical element throughout a negotiation, as both the lubricant that
enhances and facilitates the negotiation process, and the binding element that often
holds deals together’ (p. 29). Given its apparent importance and the value trust creates,
a natural question arises: What are key determinants of trust in the context of interpersonal
negotiations?
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Organisational researchers have begun to explore this question. For example, Bottom,
Holloway, Miller, Mislin, and Whitford (2006) investigated the role of small talk and nega-
tive affect on perceptions of a partner’s benevolence. Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, and
Kamdar (2011), focusing on the potential role of culture in trust development, found
that American and Indian negotiators differ from each other in their trust levels in
dyadic negotiations. More recently, Campagna, Mislin, Kong, and Bottom (2016) found
that the faking of expressed anger damages negotiators’ trust and thus renders negotia-
tors a strategic disadvantage. Other scholars have suggested that communication media
can affect both truth telling and trusting behaviours in negotiations (Naquin, Kurtzberg, &
Belkin, 2010; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998). And yet others have investigated the effects
of social motives (Olekalns, Lau, & Smith, 2002; Srivastava & Chakravarti, 2009) and friend-
ship (Olk & Elvira, 2001) on trust perceptions in the context of negotiations. However,
perhaps due to the relatively early stage of inquiry, the studies in this literature are not
well connected or integrated, producing a variety of specific individual findings without
any overall conceptual framework to guide a systematic understanding. The literature
also lacks an integrative review – whether narrative or empirical – of the empirical evi-
dence, thus limiting the ability of scholars and practitioners to ascertain the effect sizes
of a variety of predictors or identify questions for which research is lacking or findings
contradictory.
In the present paper, we provide a conceptual framework outlining the factors that are
likely to be important determinants of interpersonal trust in the context of dyadic nego-
tiations. In presenting the framework, we aim to build consensus among scholars regard-
ing the current scientific knowledge, and also provide a useful foundation for future
research. Following the tradition of social psychology, we focus on cognitive, affective,
and motivational factors that are likely to predict interpersonal trust in negotiation set-
tings. Drawing on attribution theory (Kelley, 1967; cf. Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995)
and social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; cf. McAllister, 1995), the conceptual framework
articulates three sets of factors that capture the attribution or social exchange processes
of trust development in the negotiation context: trustor attributes, trustee attributes,
and shared attributes. As we note below, this framework also largely reflects the implicit
model that the body of scholars who have conducted research on this topic have followed
in designing and conducting their studies over the last 20 years.
To verify the conceptual framework, we conducted an extensive search of the empirical
literature, which enabled us to identify, code, and meta-analyse the findings from a total of
25 independent samples that had examined the relationship between interpersonal trust
and its potential determinants in the context of dyadic interpersonal negotiations. Having
identified the empirical relationships with sufficient data to meta-analyse, we found
empirical support for the effects of two of the three factors in the conceptual framework.
In addition, our supplemental analyses suggested that some determinants identified in the
conceptual model may interact as determinants of interpersonal trust.
In sum, the present study seeks to summarise and spur research on a topic that has tre-
mendous potential for future research and that will offer significant value in the practice of
negotiation. Our study advances research on the determinants of trust in dyadic interper-
sonal negotiations in several ways. First, the conceptual framework can help scholars
understand how a variety of factors combine to influence interpersonal trust development
in negotiations. Second, because research in this area is in its early stage and yet has
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significant practical value, our meta-analysis focuses primarily on bivariate relationships
and less on moderators. This approach enables us to understand the effect sizes of com-
monly investigated predictors and thus summarise the current empirical knowledge of
predictors of trust in the negotiation context. Third, we also identify important and yet
not well understood predictors of interpersonal trust in negotiations as well as potential
boundary conditions which may alter the effects of trust determinants. In sum, the
current meta-analytic research, by taking the first step to propose an overarching frame-
work and systematically analyse the existing data, reveals the current state and promise of
this research area and abundant opportunities for future research.
Trust in dyadic interpersonal negotiations
A negotiation is often defined as a social process in which two or more parties jointly
decide how to allocate resources (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Kelley (1966) suggested
that negotiators face a ‘dilemma of trust’ in negotiations. If a negotiator believes every-
thing the counterpart says and behaves too generously, he or she may become a victim
to the counterpart’s exploitation. Conversely, if a negotiator believes nothing the counter-
part says and behaves too aggressively, the exchange of critical information between the
two negotiators will be hindered, causing suboptimal outcomes (Kong, Dirks, & Ferrin,
2014; Lewicki & Polin, 2013). Thus, a negotiator’s trust towards his or her counterpart,
though inherently risky, benefits both parties and is crucial for negotiation effectiveness.
Thus, how much should a negotiator trust his or her counterpart? And how can a negotia-
tor earn his or her counterpart’s trust?
Recent meta-analytic evidence indicates that interpersonal trust, defined as ‘a psycho-
logical state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expec-
tations of the intentions or behavior of another’ (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p.
395), is a critical determinant of integrative and distributive negotiation processes and
joint outcomes (Kong et al., 2014). While researchers have gained a better understanding
of the beneficial implications of negotiator trust, quantitative integrative reviews on the
determinants of negotiator trust are absent in the literature. To address this gap, we
propose a meta-analytic review focusing on three categories of trust determinants —
trustor attributes, trustee attributes, and shared attributes — from a componential per-
spective (Back & Kenny, 2010; Kenny & Kashy, 2014). Our review revealed that these
three proposed components also reflect, to a large degree, the variety of studies found
in the empirical literature. We describe our conceptual framework and propose our
hypotheses in the next section.
Conceptual framework and hypotheses
A dyadic relationship, such as a negotiation relationship in which trust develops, includes
two parties – trustor and trustee – and their shared context, according to Kenny and col-
leagues’ componential view on dyadic relationships (Back & Kenny, 2010; Kenny & Kashy,
2014). Trust scholars have recognised that both trustor attributes (e.g. trust propensity)
and trustee attributes (e.g. trustworthiness) can influence trust development (Fulmer &
Gelfand, 2012; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). We argue that negotiator trust is
likely to be a function of trustor attributes (perceiver effects), trustee attributes (target
24 S. C. LU ET AL.
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effects), and shared attributes (contextual effects). Specifically, based on our systematic lit-
erature search, we identified positive and negative affect, social motives, and power as
extensively studied individual attributes (mostly as trustor attributes), and pre-negotiation
relationship, small talk, communication medium, and national culture as extensively
studied shared attributes. According to attribution theory and social exchange theory,
these factors are likely to predict not only negotiators’ perceptions of their counterpart’s
trustworthiness but also their own trusting intentions. Following previous meta-analytic
research on trust in the context of negotiations (e.g. Kong et al., 2014) and other types
of social interactions (e.g. Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), we consider negotiator trust to include
negotiators’ perceptions of their counterpart’s trustworthiness, and also negotiators’
own trusting intentions.
How do trustor attributes, trustee attributes, and shared attributes shape the develop-
ment of interpersonal trust in (dyadic) interpersonal negotiations? We argue that these
attributes shape negotiators’ interpretations and expectations of dyadic exchange and
guide negotiators’ behaviours towards each other. From an attributional perspective,
Mayer et al. (1995) proposed that individuals form interpersonal trust by attributing
social cues about another party (e.g. another party’s observed small talk behaviours) to
that party’s trustworthiness (e.g. Bottom et al., 2006). Another view, which complements
the attributional view (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), is that negotiator trust emerges in social
exchange (Blau, 1964). Specifically, trust is built through a process of reciprocal exchange
and mutual influence that negotiators have towards one another (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles,
Figure 1. Conceptual framework of determinants of interpersonal trust in dyadic negotiations. Note:
The dotted line indicates a linkage assumed to be present, but not presently testable via meta-analysis
due to an insufficient number of studies available in the literature.
JOURNAL OF TRUST RESEARCH 25
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2008; Korsgaard, Brower, & Lester, 2015). Consequently, social exchange-related factors
such as affective states, social motives, power, small talk, prior relationships, and communi-
cation contexts (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1958;
Lawler & Thye, 1999) are likely to influence the development of negotiator trust. As
noted above, our search of the empirical literature on determinants of negotiator trust
uncovered only a small number of studies of trustee attributes; therefore, we will focus
our theorising and empirical analyses on trustor attributes and shared attributes. In the dis-
cussion section, we urge scholars to further investigate how trustee negotiation beha-
viours and other trustee attributes may influence trust development in dyadic
negotiations.
Figure 1 presents our conceptual framework. We use solid lines to indicate links
between trustor attributes and interpersonal trust, and between shared attributes and
interpersonal trust, for which sufficient studies are available in the literature to conduct
meta-analytic tests. In contrast to the solid lines, the dotted line between trustee attributes
and interpersonal trust indicates a linkage that is assumed to be present, but cannot pre-
sently be tested meta-analytically due to an insufficient number of studies available in the
literature.
Trustor attributes
Affect
Affect encompasses both emotions and moods (Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003). According
to its hedonic tone or valence, affect can be classified into positive affect and negative
affect (Barrett & Russell, 1998). Although some research on affect has adopted a dis-
crete-affect approach, noting that discrete affect has distinctive cognitive appraisals and
functions (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Smith & Ells-
worth, 1985), we chose a valence approach over a discrete-affect approach because the
valence approach provides a useful integrative framework (as has been noted in many
areas of affect research including affective neuroscience, cognitive development, and psy-
chopathology; Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005). Additionally, we did not have a suffi-
ciently large sample size for conducting a meta-analysis from a discrete-affect perspective.
Researchers have examined the intrapersonal functions of affect across a range of social
situations, explaining how affect can shape attention, thoughts, memory, and judgment
(Erez & Isen, 2002; Isen, Niedenthal, & Cantor, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Watson
& Tellegen, 1985). While changes in the environment can evoke different affective
states (Frijda, 1987, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 1980), affective states convey infor-
mation about the nature of the environment: positive affective states signal to individuals
that the environment is lenient and potential rewards are present and thus motivate indi-
viduals to maintain such positive feelings, whereas negative affective states signal to indi-
viduals that the environment is threatening and thus compel the individuals to enact
appropriate action and repair their negative feelings (Baumann & DeSteno, 2010; Frijda,
1987; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Consistent with this logic, in a series of
five experiments, Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) provided evidence that positive affective
states increased interpersonal trust towards coworkers or acquaintances whereas negative
affective states decreased interpersonal trust. Similarly, Forgas and East (2008) found that
26 S. C. LU ET AL.
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negative mood increased, whereas positive mood decreased, people’s scepticism in decid-
ing whether the target was guilty or innocent of taking an item of value.
Therefore, we argue that positive affect leads negotiators to form positive perceptions
of their counterpart’s trustworthiness and intentions to accept vulnerability to their
counterpart’s behaviours, whereas negative affect leads negotiators to form negative per-
ceptions of their counterpart’s trustworthiness and intentions to accept their vulnerability
to their counterpart’s behaviours. Accordingly, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Trustor positive affect is positively related to trust in a negotiation counterpart.
Hypothesis 2. Trustor negative affect is negatively related to trust in a negotiation counterpart.
Social motives
Defined as the extent to which people weight their own outcomes versus others’ out-
comes in socially interdependent situations (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Van
Lange & De Dreu, 2001), social motives have long been identified as a potentially impor-
tant determinant of negotiation behaviours (De Dreu, Weingart, et al., 2000; Deutsch,
1969). Dispositionally, some negotiators have relatively prosocial motives – to maximise
the joint outcome – whereas others have relatively proself/egoistic motives – to maximise
their own outcome. Extant evidence indicates that individuals with prosocial motives
tend to think and act in a collectively rational manner, whereas individuals with proself
motives tend to think and act in an individually rational manner (De Cremer & Van
Lange, 2001). Consequently, we argue that prosocial vs. proself motives could influence
interpersonal trust in dyadic negotiations by guiding negotiators’ rationality and social
perceptions.
First, social motives should directly influence negotiators’ perceptions of their counter-
part and the nature of exchange even before the negotiation begins. There are moderately
strong links between social motives and beliefs regarding others’ interpersonal orien-
tations as well as the level of confidence they have in such beliefs (De Cremer & Van
Lange, 2001; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). Research indicates that negotiators’ prosocial
(versus proself) motives inhibit their win–lose mindset; in contrast, negotiators’ proself
motive triggers a win–lose mindset and a fixed-pie bias (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De
Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000): ‘In theory, egoistic negotiators
develop distrust, hostile attitudes, and negative interpersonal perceptions… . Prosocial
negotiators, in contrast, develop trust, positive attitudes and perceptions, engage in con-
structive exchange of information, listen, and seek to understand one another’s perspec-
tive’ (De Dreu, Weingart, et al., 2000, p. 891). Thus, prosocial motives lead negotiators to
have positive attitudes and perceptions about their counterpart and social exchange
and thus form trust towards their counterpart.
Second, as a specific negotiation proceeds and concludes, compared to proself nego-
tiators, prosocial negotiators are more likely to think and behave in a problem-solving and
non-contentious manner (with such behaviours likely to be reciprocated by the counter-
part; Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & Genovese, 1999), and earn higher joint outcomes (De
Dreu, Weingart, et al., 2000). Compared to proself negotiators who direct their attention
and seek information that is more advantageous for them, prosocial negotiators search
for information that supports mutually beneficial information exchange (Van Lange &
JOURNAL OF TRUST RESEARCH 27
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De Dreu, 2001). The social process of exchanging mutually beneficial information and
cooperating with one another is likely to engender interpersonal trust (Blau, 1964; Cropan-
zano & Mitchell, 2005). Taken together, the above arguments lead us to propose the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Trustor prosocial (versus proself) motives are positively related to trust in a nego-
tiation counterpart.
Power
One factor inherent in virtually all negotiations is negotiator power, which, according to
Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale (2005), can include potential power, power in use, and realised
power. Although negotiator power has been conceptualised in a number of ways, one
dominant conceptualisation in negotiation contexts is the negotiator’s possession of a
strong ‘Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement’ (BATNA) (Kim et al., 2005). Although
power can be viewed as a relational variable (with one party’s power determined in part by
the other party’s power or dependence), a BATNA can also be viewed as a negotiator’s
individual attribute that only this negotiator possesses in a specific negotiation (Kim
et al., 2005). Consistent with this view, and recognising that the dominant approach in
the literature on trust and negotiation to date has been to conceptualise and operationa-
lise power as an individual rather than relational construct, in this paper we also treat
power as an individual attribute.
A strong BATNA enables a negotiator to easily walk away from a negotiation and seek
an alternative counterpart for resources (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). The negotiator who
recognises that he or she has such power is likely to consider himself or herself in a pos-
ition to exert strong control over the process of the current negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991).
Given that trust is defined as the willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive
expectations of the intentions or behaviours of another (Mayer et al., 1995), a negotiator
who perceives himself or herself as having high power is likely to form cynical attributions
for others’ prosocial behaviours (Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky, 2012) and therefore may
reduce positive perceptions of others and subsequent interpersonal trust. Moreover,
because powerful negotiators have more control over the negotiation process, they are
likely to perceive less uncertainty, risk, and dependence in the negotiation, which
makes interpersonal trust less necessary for cooperation and negotiation effectiveness
(cf. Rousseau et al., 1998). Accordingly, we argue that negotiators with higher power
have less positive perceptions of their counterpart and a weaker desire to trust or rely
on their counterpart, thereby resulting in lower trust towards their counterpart.
Hypothesis 4. Trustor power is negatively related to trust in a negotiation counterpart.
Shared attributes
The negotiation literature has focused primarily on four shared attributes: the pre-nego-
tiation relationship, small talk, communication medium, and national culture.
Pre-negotiation relationship
Kramer (1999) argued that trust is history-based, that is, ‘[i]nteraction histories give
decision makers information that is useful in assessing others’ dispositions, intentions,
28 S. C. LU ET AL.
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and motives. This information, in turn, provides a basis for drawing inferences regarding
their trustworthiness and for making predictions about their future behavior’ (p. 575;
also see Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994, p. 124). Kramer’s argument is consist-
ent with social exchange theory, which claims that trust emerges from episodes of
exchange interactions and in turn influences subsequent exchange processes (Blau, 1964).
Although a pre-negotiation relationship can be negative and thus may convey infor-
mation regarding the counterpart’s lack of trustworthiness, almost all existing negotiation
studies have focused on positive pre-negotiation relationships (e.g. friendships). In
addition, as the Vanneste, Puranam, and Kretschmer (2014) meta-analysis has shown,
trust generally grows over time as two parties have more exchange episodes with one
another, even when individuals have pessimistic initial beliefs about the counterpart’s
trustworthiness.
Why would a pre-negotiation relationship positively predict interpersonal trust? First,
interactions lead people to identify with each other over time as they internalise each
other’s preferences (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). Quali-
tative social network research provides suggestive evidence that social ties increase trust,
information sharing, and cooperation by increasing the predictability of counterpart beha-
viours and the ability to anticipate each other’s interests and preferences (Uzzi, 1997,
1999). Second, in the process of information and resource exchange, negotiators are
likely to gather accurate information about their counterparts which can help them over-
come any initial pessimistic beliefs about their counterparts that they may have had. And
as they learn more about each other’s preferences and values, they are likely to further
identify with each other. Third, considering that many relationships are voluntary, negotia-
tors tend to choose trustworthy counterparts, if possible, and distance themselves from
untrustworthy counterparts by ending their relationships early or withdrawing their rela-
tional investment (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006). Thus, trust should be high
in long-lived relationships because many relationships are voluntarily formed, and conse-
quently untrustworthy partners may be excluded over time (Gambetta, 1988).
Based on the above arguments and evidence, we propose that the presence of a pre-
negotiation relationship is likely to facilitate negotiator trust.
Hypothesis 5. The presence of a pre-negotiation relationship is positively related to trust in a
negotiation counterpart.
Small talk
Defined as a type of conversation seemingly unrelated to the task at hand (Bottom et al.,
2006), small talk is typically informal and pleasant in nature. Negotiators are often advised
that, rather than jumping straight into the ‘business’ of a negotiation, they should first
engage in small talk to lubricate the interaction with some rapport, which ultimately
benefits negotiators economically and relationally (Bottom et al., 2006; Mislin, Campagna,
& Bottom, 2011; Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002).
Small talk conveys affection and formal courtesies, and expresses fairness and reliability
(Bottom et al., 2006). Engaging in small talk allows people to reveal their ‘humanness’ to
each other by disclosing personal information (e.g. Lundeen & Schuldt, 1989). Negotiators
can form emotional bonds when they discover that they and their counterpart are associ-
ated with a common group, use similar language or jargon, or share similar attitudes,
JOURNAL OF TRUST RESEARCH 29
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
1:4
7 2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
values and interests (Ferrin et al., 2008). At the same time, friendliness expressed during
small talk can induce positive affect, positive attitudes, cooperative mindsets, positive
social perceptions, and honest information exchange (Bottom et al., 2006; Mislin et al.,
2011; Morris et al., 2002). Thus, small talk can promote social cohesiveness and reduce
the tension of a potentially threatening or competitive situation (Coupland & Ylänne-
McEwen, 2014). Accordingly, we hypothesise that the presence of small talk will facilitate
interpersonal trust:
Hypothesis 6. The presence of small talk is positively related to trust in a negotiation
counterpart.
Communication medium
Email communication and other forms of computer-mediated or virtual communication
(CMC) are increasingly common in daily life; consequently, CMC negotiations have increas-
ingly captured scholarly attention (Morris et al., 2002; Swaab, Galinsky, Medvec, & Dierme-
ier, 2012). How do CMC negotiations differ from face-to-face (FTF) negotiations? The key
distinction is that in FTF negotiations individuals can use numerous modes of communi-
cation, such as vocal communication (e.g. voice inflection, sighs), facial expressions, body
language (e.g. gestures, touch), and verbal or textual communication, whereas in CMC
negotiation individuals largely rely on textual communication rather than a mixture of
communication modes (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Swaab et al., 2012; Trevino, Daft, & Lengel,
1990).
From the communication medium richness perspective, ambiguity reduction is a func-
tion of the medium’s ability to facilitate feedback, communicate multiple cues, present
individually tailored messages, and use natural language to convey subtleties; the capacity
of a communication channel to convey multiple communication cues determines the
extent to which people will be able to work effectively with each other (Daft & Lengel,
1986; Swaab et al., 2012). As the ability to carry nonverbal information increases, the
ability to effectively communicate complex ideas, thoughts, and affect also increases
(Daft & Lengel, 1986; Trevino et al., 1990). Whereas CMC sufficiently conveys task-
related information, it is suboptimal for conveying relational or other non-task-related
information (Naquin & Paulson, 2003).
The implication of the above-mentioned communication medium difference is that
developing rapport and trust is likely to be more difficult via CMC versus FTF communi-
cation (Swaab et al., 2012). Previous research has found that negotiators exchange
more honest information in FTF negotiations than in textual or email negotiations
(McGinn & Keros, 2002; Valley, Thompson, Gibbons, & Bazerman, 2002), and they also
feel more satisfied about their outcomes and relationships in FTF negotiations (Purdy,
Nye, & Balakrishnan, 2000). FTF interactions are more likely to induce socially desirable
behaviours such as truth telling, other regarding (Valley et al., 1998), and rapport build-
ing (Drolet & Morris, 2000), than communication via telephone or text-only communi-
cation (McGinn & Croson, 2004). In contrast, CMC may make individuals less aware of
others, more aggressive, more task-oriented, and less civil, and may create a sense of
social distance (Naquin & Paulson, 2003). Consequently, we expect trust in a negotiation
counterpart to be higher in FTF as compared to CMC negotiations.
30 S. C. LU ET AL.
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Hypothesis 7. A FTF (versus CMC) communication medium is positively related to trust in a
negotiation counterpart.
National culture
In this analysis, we focus on intra-cultural negotiation, which means that the two negotia-
tors operate within the same culture, and thus the cultural assumptions, values, etc. are
shared between them. A national culture not only determines individuals’ dispositional
trust (Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010; Kong, 2013, 2016) but also influences how individuals
believe they should behave in a given situation and how they interpret others’ behaviours
(Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007). When two negotiators are from a common culture, their
shared culture serves as a common interpretive and normative guide to individual trust
and behaviours in general (Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010; Johnson & Cullen, 2002) as well as
in negotiation settings specifically (Gunia et al., 2011).
National cultures can be categorised along numerous dimensions (e.g. Hofstede, 1991).
Given the inherent focus of trust on uncertainty tolerance/avoidance, one dimension of
culture that is particularly relevant to trust is the tightness–looseness dimension
(Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Triandis, 2004). Compared with loose cultures (e.g. the
United States), tight cultures (e.g. China and India) tend to have strong, clearly defined,
and reliably imposed social norms (Gelfand, Nishii, et al., 2006) that enforce behavioural
expectations through control (e.g. monitoring and sanctioning) and thus inhibit improvi-
sation or interpretation (Gunia et al., 2011). Cultural tightness–looseness is therefore likely
to influence the extent to which social norms are imposed and the extent to which indi-
viduals are sensitive to such social norms in interpersonal situations such as negotiations.
Individuals in tight cultures are likely to manage their relationships based to a large degree
on situational norms and constraints, whereas individuals in loose cultures are relatively
more likely to manage their relationships based on interpersonal trust (Branzei, Vertinsky,
& Camp, 2007). Furthermore, imposed social norms in tight cultures are likely to lead nego-
tiators to attribute others’ trustworthy behaviours to external or situational factors, thus
crowding out interpersonal trust (Cialdini, 1996; Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007; Malhotra &
Murnighan, 2002). In other words, compared to individuals in tight cultures, those in
loose cultures are more likely to rely on interpersonal trust (versus strict norms and sanc-
tions) for cooperation. Accordingly, we expect negotiator trust to be higher in loose
national cultures as compared to tight national cultures.
Hypothesis 8. Cultural looseness (versus tightness) is positively related to trust in a negotiation
counterpart.
Method
Literature search
Sample
We conducted a systematic literature search to identify all accessible published and
unpublished studies reporting bivariate relationships between interpersonal trust and
its potential determinants in the context of dyadic negotiations. The search terms we
used to identify negotiation studies included negotiat*, bargaining, bargainer, dispute, or
JOURNAL OF TRUST RESEARCH 31
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
1:4
7 2
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
disputant in the titles, subject terms, or keywords of papers. We limited the search to nego-
tiation studies that examined trust as a key variable by using the terms trust, trustworthi-
ness, perceived ability, perceived competence, benevolence, benevolent, integrity, reliability,
reliable, dependability, or dependable in the titles, subject terms, or keywords of the papers.
Our systematic literature search comprised several specific steps. First, using the search
terms described above, we searched the PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, Web of Science, Wiley
Interscience, ScienceDirect, Dissertation & Theses (ProQuest), Social Science Research
Network, and Academy of Management Archive search engines/databases. Second,
using the same search terms, we searched specific journals across several disciplines,
including Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administra-
tive Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, Organization Science, Personnel Psychology, Journal of International
Business Studies, Industrial & Labor Relations Review, Journal of Management Studies,
Journal of Organizational Behavior, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, Management Science, Negotiation and Conflict Management
Research, American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, Journal of Exper-
imental Social Psychology, American Economic Review, and International Journal of Conflict
Management. Third, recognising that recent meta-analyses might have included studies
relevant to the current meta-analysis, we checked the references of and citations to
Kong et al. (2014) and Colquitt, Scott, and LePine (2007). Fourth, recognising that
studies of the determinants of trust would likely have cited the field’s most influential
and seminal article, we checked citations to Mayer et al. (1995) through Web of
Science. Fifth, to identify unpublished studies and work in progress, we called for unpub-
lished papers via ListServs of the Academy of Management, the International Association
for Conflict Management, and the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, and we
also directly contacted prominent scholars working in this research area to request
unpublished studies. Finally, we used the Google Scholar search engine to identify
any papers that were relevant but had not been found using the procedures described
above.
Inclusion criteria
We followed the method of Kong et al. (2014) and only included studies that focused on
dyadic negotiations with no third-party mediation involved. Studies that focused on other
entities or levels, such as intergroup negotiations or organisation-level negotiations, were
excluded. In addition, we excluded Ultimatum Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, Trust
Game, and allocation decision making studies from our analysis. Studies that did not
report empirical findings were also excluded.
For analysis of the effects of communication medium on trust, we only included studies
that varied FTF versus CMC medium within the specific study (typically as a manipulated
variable). By doing so, we ensured that the included papers were likely to control for
exogenous factors that could influence trust levels such as measurement or sample differ-
ences. In other words, to assess the effects of FTF versus CMC on trust we did not meta-
analyse data from a set of studies in which some studies focused only on FTF negotiations
and others focused only on CMC negotiations, because the results of such an analysis
would be susceptible to alternative explanations attributable to exogenous factors that
might have co-varied across the FTF and CMC conditions. Similarly, in estimating the
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bivariate relationships between national culture and negotiator trust, we only included
those studies in which the study sample included tight and loose cultures (typically
coded as a dummy variable).
Variable coding
Our search uncovered 25 papers and dissertations/theses for coding. The population-esti-
mation of a bivariate relationship often requires at least three studies (k≥ 3) (Fehr, Gelfand,
& Nag, 2010). Thus, we only considered variables whose bivariate relationships with trust
were reported in at least three independent studies. Three authors coded the papers and
reached consensus upon discussion. Given the nature of the variables of interest, the
coding involved minimal ambiguity.
Many papers included in this meta-analysis used experimental manipulation to inves-
tigate the effects of various trust determinants. For example, Campagna et al. (2016)
used an emotional expression manipulation to elicit different affect levels; Olekalns
et al. (2002) manipulated social motives by encouraging participants to focus on maximis-
ing either individual or joint outcomes; Campagna, Bottom, Kong, and Mislin (2010)
manipulated power by instructing one party that they had another job offer available
to them; Olk and Elvira (2001) randomly assigned participants to negotiate with either a
friend or an unacquainted person; and Mislin et al. (2011) gave participants in the small
talk condition a 10-minute period in which to engage in open text messaging whereas par-
ticipants in the no talk condition moved directly to contracting. For our analysis of national
culture, United States samples were coded as loose cultures and China and India samples
were coded as tight cultures. This coding is consistent with prior research on loose vs. tight
cultures, for example, Gunia et al. (2011) compared negotiators in the U.S. versus India and
Zhang, Liu, and Liu (2014) compared those in the U.S. versus China.
Other papers measured rather than manipulated the variables identified as predictors
of trust. For example, Liu and Wang (2010) measured positive and negative affect with
compassion and anger scales, respectively. Miller, Farmer, Miller, and Peters (2010)
measured pre-negotiation relationship with the familiarity with the other party scale.
The Appendix provides detailed information on the included papers.
Analysis
We transformed the Pearson’s r, Cohen’s d, F- and t-statistics to Fisher’s z. If studies
reported relationships for multiple types of trust (e.g. cognition-based trust, affect-based
trust, general trust), we randomly selected one type of trust for analysis (Kong et al.,
2014). We conducted our analyses using the software MIX Pro 2.0 (Bax, Yu, Ikeda,
Tsuruta, & Moons, 2006). We performed random-effects analyses, assuming that the
studies were not drawn from the same population and were not functionally equivalent
(Hedges & Vevea, 1998). The sample heterogeneity statistics (Q and I2) largely supported
this assumption. We individually corrected each observed effect size for attenuation due to
unreliability in the measurement. If a trust determinant was manipulated, its alpha was
coded as 1. If a study used a single item measure or did not report the alpha of a
measure, we coded the alpha as 1. This coding errs towards overstating rather than under-
stating reliability and therefore should produce more conservative results (i.e. smaller
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Table 1. Meta-analytic summary of determinants of interpersonal trust in dyadic negotiations.
k Nindividuals r (uncorrected) 95% CI (r) (uncorrected) r (corrected) 95% CI (r) (corrected) Q I
2 (%)
Trustor attributes
Positive affect 14 2341 .35 [.22, .47] .39 [.25, .51] 101.56*** 87.20
Negative affect 9 1537 −.28 [−.35, −.20] −.32 [−.40, −.24] 14.84 46.09
Power 3 354 .00 [−.14, .15] .00 [−.14, .15] 1.46 0.00
Prosocial (vs. proself) motive 3 256 .45 [.11, .70] .52 [.11, .78] 12.46** 83.94
Shared attributes
Pre-negotiation relationship 7 1068 .30 [.13, .46] .35 [.15, .51] 35.93*** 83.30
Small talk 4 602 .23 [.01, .43] .26 [.002, .49] 15.00*** 80.00
Communication medium (FTF vs. CMC) 3 316 .46 [.11, .70] .57 [.01, .86] 30.63*** 93.47
National culture (looseness vs. tightness) 4 791 .26 [.03, .47] .32 [.02, .56] 32.32*** 90.72
Note: Given that Q is statistically under-powered when the number of studies is low and when the sample size within the studies is low, we also provided I2 [= 100% × (Q–df)/Q], whose larger
values indicate more heterogeneity. Typically, an I2 of 75% indicates large heterogeneity, 50% moderate heterogeneity, and 25% low heterogeneity.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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effect sizes) after correcting for attenuation due to unreliability. We calculated an optimally
weighted corrected mean effect size (Fisher’s z) and converted it back to a correlation coef-
ficient r, by weighting each effect size as a function of inverse variance (Cohn & Becker,
2003). We used the 95% confidence interval (CI) of an estimated correlation coefficient
to determine the significance of a bivariate relationship; if a 95% CI excludes zero, its cor-
responding weighted mean correlation is interpreted to be significantly different from
zero.
For the bivariate relationships in Table 1, we further corrected for publication bias (Begg
& Mazumdar, 1994) caused by the ‘file drawer problem’ (Rosenthal, 1979), if any. We
adopted the ‘trim-and-fill’method (fixed effects) (Duval & Tweedie, 2000), which accounts
for the sample sizes of the studies and estimates both the number of unpublished studies
and the publication-bias-adjusted estimate of the true mean effect size (Geyskens, Krish-
nan, Steenkamp, & Cunha, 2009). The trim-and-fill technique (Duval & Tweedie, 2000) is
based on the assumption that the full set of possible studies on a topic will be distributed
symmetrically around a true mean. In estimating the number of plausibly missing studies,
the trim-and-fill method ‘trims’ the outlying studies that do not have a counterpart on the
other side of the mean. The mean effect is recalculated, often resulting in a more conser-
vative effect size; the outlying studies are returned, and their counterparts are estimated
based on the new mean level effect size.
Paterson, Harms, Steel, and Credé (2016) compiled information from more than 250
meta-analyses conducted over the past 30 years in the organisational behaviour and
human resources literatures and found an average corrected effect of rcorrected = .28.
And more specific to the present study, they found an average corrected effect of
rcorrected = .22 for studies of interpersonal processes. Because there is substantial varia-
bility in the distribution of bivariate relationships’ effect sizes across research
domains (Bosco, Aguinis, Singh, Field, & Pierce, 2015; Paterson et al., 2016), we interpret
the magnitude of the true mean correlation estimates in reference to these estimates
by Paterson et al. (2016) rather than the conventional benchmarks proposed by Cohen
(1988), and accordingly we characterise our estimates as ‘below-average’, ‘average’, or
‘above-average’ in relation to Paterson et al.’s benchmarks. Using Paterson et al.’s
(2016) benchmarks should help researchers produce better-informed non-nil hypoth-
eses, estimate statistical power, and plan appropriate sample sizes in dyadic negotiation
research.
Results
Bivariate relationships between trustor attributes and interpersonal trust
The meta-analytic results are presented in Table 1. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2,
which, respectively, predicted an overall positive relationship between trustor positive
affect and trust in a negotiation counterpart and an overall negative relationship
between trustor negative affect and trust in a negotiation counterpart, we found a
positive and above-average-size relationship between positive affect and negotiator
trust (rcorrected = .39, CI95% [.25, .51]) and a negative and above-average-size relationship
between negative affect and negotiator trust (rcorrected =−.32, CI95% [−.40, −.24]).
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, which predicted a positive relationship between prosocial
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(vs. proself) motives and trust in a negotiation counterpart, we found a positive and
above-average-size relationship between prosocial (vs. proself) motives and negotiator
trust (rcorrected = .52, CI95% [.11, .78]). Power had a null relationship with negotiator trust
(rcorrected = .00, CI95% [−.14, .15]), rendering no support for Hypothesis 4.
Bivariate relationships between shared attributes and interpersonal trust
The presence of a pre-negotiation relationship and small talk, two shared attributes, were
predicted to be positively related to trust in a negotiation counterpart (Hypotheses 5 and
6). We found support for a positive and above-average-size relationship between the pres-
ence of a pre-negotiation relationship and negotiator trust (rcorrected = .35, CI95% [.15, .51])
and the presence of small talk and negotiator trust (rcorrected = .26, CI95% [.002, .49]). Thus,
both Hypotheses 5 and 6 were supported. Consistent with Hypotheses 7 and 8 which,
respectively, predicted that FTF (vs. CMC) medium and cultural looseness (vs. tightness)
would have positive relationships with negotiator trust, we found positive and above-
average-size relationships for FTF (vs. CMC) medium with negotiator trust (rcorrected = .57,
CI95% [.01, .86]) and cultural looseness (vs. tightness) with negotiator trust (rcorrected = .32,
CI95% [.02, .56]).
Publication bias
A trim-and-fill (fixed effects) method was used for correcting publication bias. We did not
detect publication bias for positive affect, negative affect, power, communication medium,
and national culture. After correcting publication bias, we found a positive and average-
size relationship between prosocial (vs. proself) motives and negotiator trust (rpublication
bias corrected = .22, CI95% [.09, .35]), a positive and above-average-size relationship
between pre-negotiation relationship and negotiator trust (rpublication bias corrected = .27,
CI95% [.19, .34]), and a positive and above-average-size relationship between small talk
and negotiator trust (rpublication bias corrected = .44, CI95% [.36, .52]). Comparing these
results to the results above, we found the three effect sizes became smaller, which
suggesting some non-confirmatory results might not be published. However, given that
a trim-and-fill method has recently been criticised by some statisticians (Simonsohn,
Nelson, & Simmons, 2014; Terrin, Schmid, Lau, & Olkin, 2003), interpretation of our
results may also require caution.
Supplemental moderator analyses
We recognised that some of the bivariate relationships examined in our meta-analysis
might be subject to moderation effects. First, it is frequently recognised that mode of com-
munication (FTF versus CMC) will result not only in a main effect, but may also moderate
the effects of other predictors on a given outcome (Swaab et al., 2012). Second, past meta-
analyses (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Kong et al., 2014) have found that effects often vary accord-
ing to how the trust variable is operationalised. The relatively high level of sample hetero-
geneity (Q and I2) and relatively large number of independent samples in the relationships
between positive and negative affect and trust afforded the opportunity to conduct sup-
plemental moderator analyses for these two expected effects.
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First, we subjected the relationship between positive affect and trust and the relationship
between negative affect and trust to tests of between-group homogeneity (Hedges & Olkin,
2014). A significant between-group homogeneity statistic (QB) indicates a significant
between-group difference in the estimates of the mean effect sizes (i.e. significant moder-
ation). We found that the relationship between positive affect and trust was stronger in
CMC (rcorrected = .51) versus FTF (rcorrected = .20) negotiations (QB = 34.07, p < .001). In contrast,
we found no indication that the relationship between negative affect and trust differed
significantly in CMC (rcorrected = –.35) versus FTF (rcorrected =−.35) negotiations (QB = .00, n.s.).
Second, we examined whether the trust definition – trust (trustworthiness) perceptions
vs. trust intentions – would moderate the relationships between positive affect and nego-
tiator trust and between negative affect and negotiator trust. We found that the relation-
ship between positive affect and negotiator trust was stronger when trust was measured
as trust perceptions (rcorrected = .51) versus trust intentions (rcorrected = .30) (QB = 15.54,
p < .001). In contrast, we did not find a significant moderating effect of trust definition
on the relationship between negative affect and negotiator trust (QB = 1.41, n.s.). We
also tested whether trust type (i.e. affect- vs. cognition-based trust) would moderate the
relationship between positive affect and negotiator trust; no support was found for this
effect.
Due to the limited number of independent samples, we were unable to test whether
communication medium or trust definition moderated any other bivariate relationships
between trustor attributes and negotiator trust, or shared attributes and negotiator trust.
Discussion
Although trust is assumed to be integral to the negotiation experience, to date there has
apparently been no attempt to systematically or quantitatively summarise the scientific
evidence on the determinants of interpersonal trust in the context of dyadic negotiations.
In the present research, we undertook an exploratory approach, presenting a conceptual
framework entailing three broad categories of determinants of negotiator trust: trustor
attributes, trustee attributes, and shared attributes. Trust scholars have categorised the
commonly investigated antecedents of interpersonal trust within organisations into
several bases including dispositional trust, history-based trust, third parties as conduits
of trust, category-based trust, and rule-based trust (Kramer, 1999). Our categorisation of
trust determinants complements these bases identified by other scholars. For example,
we deemed affect and social motives, alongside with trust propensity, as trustor attributes.
We also considered how shared attributes such as communication medium and national
culture, alongside with third parties as conduits of trust, could predict negotiator trust.
We then conducted meta-analytic tests to estimate the overall effects of trustor attri-
butes and shared attributes on negotiator trust. Due to an insufficient number of indepen-
dent samples on trustee attributes, we did not meta-analyse their effects on negotiator
trust. In addition, we conducted supplemental moderation tests and found that some
trust determinants interact with each other, and also that the operationalisation of trust
exerts a moderator effect, in determining negotiator trust. Taken together, our findings
shed light on the current state of knowledge in this area and should also help scholars
identify important avenues for future research.
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Implications for research
Trustor attributes and shared attributes
In cumulating the empirical evidence, our meta-analysis indicates that trustor attributes
(positive affect, negative affect, and social motives) and shared attributes (the presence
of a pre-negotiation relationship, the presence of small talk, a FTF vs. CMC medium, and
a loose vs. tight national culture) all have significant and relatively strong relationships
with interpersonal trust in dyadic negotiations. Several specific findings warrant further
discussion.
First, we note that FTF (vs. CMC) negotiations had a surprisingly large relationship with
trust (rcorrected = .57), highlighting the importance of building trust via FTF negotiations.
The magnitude of the effect size estimate is more than twice the magnitude of typical
interpersonal process effect sizes reported in the field of organisational behaviour and
human resources (Paterson et al., 2016). Of course, given the relatively small number of
studies included in the meta-analysis, caution is warranted in interpreting this effect
size, and further research on this topic is clearly needed. Our findings would not lead us
to suggest that practitioners avoid CMC negotiations at all cost (e.g. Parlamis & Ames,
2010), as it would be impossible to do so in today’s highly technology-enabled business
world. Instead, we recommend that researchers search for ways to effectively build trust
in CMC negotiations. For example, Morris et al. (2002) found that engaging in a relation-
ship-building chat prior to a virtual negotiation could establish rapport and the requisite
positive feelings that may contribute to subsequent cooperation.
Second, prosocial (vs. proself) motives had a strong, positive relationship with trust
(rcorrected = .52). The magnitude of the effect size estimate is again about twice the magni-
tude of the relevant effect sizes reported by Paterson et al. (2016), highlighting an impor-
tant role for motivation-related individual differences in negotiators’ trust development.
We note that meta-analyses of determinants of interpersonal trust in other contexts,
such as leadership and the workplace (Colquitt et al., 2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), have
focused on individuals’ trust propensity as the focal individual difference variable, and
have reported small but significant effects. Future research will therefore benefit from con-
sidering whether negotiators’ trust propensity might be related to interpersonal trust,
independently or jointly with social motives. And equally, future research is likely to
benefit from considering whether prosocial vs. proself motives may predict interpersonal
trust in contexts other than negotiation.
Third, the present meta-analysis found a null relationship between trustor power and
trust. This null relationship seems consistent with the interpersonal circumplex model in
personality and social psychology, which proposes that agency/dominance (power) and
communion/affiliation (trust) are orthogonal dimensions underlying interpersonal traits
and behaviours (Conte & Plutchik, 1981; Gifford & O’Connor, 1987). Nevertheless, future
research should further investigate how power may influence negotiator trust. Given
that power magnifies the expression of dispositions (e.g. Anderson & Thompson, 2004;
Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012), it is possible that power may play a moderator role altering
the relationship between trustor dispositional factors (e.g. prosocial versus proself
motives) and negotiator trust. Accordingly, we urge researchers to focus on investigating
the conditions under which power may or may not relate to negotiator trust, and also what
dispositional factors’ effects on negotiator trust may be moderated by power.
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Fourth, in the present meta-analysis, there were a total of four independent samples
that provided sufficient statistical and other information for us to meta-analytically esti-
mate the bivariate relationship between cultural looseness (vs. tightness) and negotiator
trust. Despite the close relevance of the cultural looseness vs. tightness dimension to
trust, the literature provides relatively little insight into how and why trust levels and
dynamics are likely to differ across these dimensions. Our meta-analytic results indicate
that future research is very much warranted to explore these phenomena. Additionally,
in our meta-analyses, we defined national culture as a shared attribute for both a
trustor and a trustee, rather than as an individual cultural value. We note that the
current negotiation literature provides little insight into how individual cultural values
relate to negotiator trust in intercultural negotiations. Given the increasing prevalence
of intercultural negotiations, we urge scholars to further examine how cultural differences,
particularly in looseness vs. tightness, and also intercultural dynamics, influence negotiator
trust.
Interplay of determining attributes
Research on trust determinants in negotiation settings is still in its early stage and the large
majority of negotiation studies has focused on the effects of trustor or shared attributes,
neglecting trustee attributes, and also largely neglecting the potential interplay of predic-
tors. The moderating effects of FTF vs. CMC, and trust definition (trust perceptions vs. trust
intentions), on the relationship between trustor positive affect and trust suggest that
exploring the interplay of various trust determinants deserves more research attention
and is a promising avenue for future research.
The literature on affect suggests that heuristic processing occurs when individuals are
not very familiar with others and lack adequate information for systematic processing
(Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; Schwarz, 1990). Compared to FTF negotiations in which
negotiators have richer, observable information about their counterpart, CMC negotiators
are compelled to rely more upon the information conveyed by their feelings to make heur-
istic judgments about their counterpart. Consequently, positive affect, which is strongly
associated with heuristic processing (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) and facilitates
self-other overlap (Waugh & Fredrickson, 2006), is more likely to facilitate interpersonal
trust in CMC versus FTF negotiations. Due to the reduced information conveyed in CMC
negotiations as compared to FTF negotiators, CMC negotiators have fewer nonverbal
cues for their trust judgments than FTF negotiators. Thus, positive affect, as nonverbal
information, is likely to be more salient and important to CMC negotiators’ heuristic pro-
cessing than to that of FTF negotiators. We also note that for practitioners, our findings
suggest that particularly in CMC negotiations, negotiators should focus on methods to
induce positive affect in their counterpart to develop their counterpart’s trust in them.
The moderating effect of the trust definition on the relationship between positive affect
and negotiator trust can be explained using Mayer et al.’s (1995) model. According to
Mayer and colleagues (1995), trust intentions are determined by trust perceptions (per-
ceived trustworthiness) and thus are probably less susceptible to the influences of intra-
and interpersonal and contextual factors. Therefore, positive affect is expected to have
a stronger relationship with trust perceptions than with trust intentions. Meanwhile, the
non-significant moderating effect of the trust definition on the relationship between nega-
tive affect and negotiator trust is somewhat surprising to us. Given that negative affective
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states have a greater variety of distinctive manifestations than positive affective states
(Frijda, 1987), and some negative affective states have stronger effects on interpersonal
trust than others (e.g. Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), the non-significant result may be due
in part to differences in the specific negative affective states included in the primary
studies.
A logical and promising next step for academic researchers will be to explore how com-
munication medium and trust definition may modify the effects of other trustor and
trustee attributes on negotiator trust. For example, Swaab et al. (2012) proposed and ver-
ified a communication orientation model in which communication medium and commu-
nicators’ social motives interact with one another in determining whether negotiators and
decision-makers achieve high-quality outcomes. Although they did not investigate nego-
tiator trust, their logic can be applied to the development of negotiator trust.
Limitations and directions for future research
Given that trust is widely recognised, both by practitioners and academic scholars, as
important to negotiation effectiveness, we were surprised by the relatively small
number of empirical studies that have examined the determinants of trust in the
context of dyadic negotiations. Only a small number of trustor attributes and shared attri-
butes have received systematic attention to date, and the number of independent studies
examining any of these variables is also relatively small. We were particularly surprised that
the number of studies examining the relationships of trustee attributes with negotiator
trust was so small that meta-analysis was impossible.
Many practitioner sources on the topic of negotiation (e.g. Malhotra, 2004) prescribe a
range of strategies and behaviours that negotiators (i.e. trustees) can employ to earn trust.
Such advice apparently has a limited empirical base. Meanwhile, trust has been found to
be a critical determinant of negotiators’ integrative and distributive behaviours (Kong
et al., 2014). Yet whether and how these negotiation behaviours influence trust develop-
ment has also not been systematically investigated. Based on our meta-analytic findings,
we suggest that the trustor attributes of positive affect, negative affect, prosocial (vs.
proself) motive, and power may also influence trust as trustee attributes. For example, posi-
tive affect and negative affect might predict trust through affective contagion effects (Brief
& Weiss, 2002; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Similarly, the Emotion as Social Infor-
mation Model suggests an interpersonal route through which emotions can regulate social
behaviours (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010), which are in turn likely
to predict trust. Following the same logic as was presented for trustors above, a trustee’s
social motive could also influence negotiation dynamics as a negotiation proceeds and
concludes, which could then predict negotiator trust. For trustee power, researchers
have observed that dependence on a trustee is likely to positively predict interpersonal
trust because attributions of trustworthiness will be affected by individuals’ feelings of
dependence (Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2004). When the negotiator (trustor) per-
ceives that the counterpart (trustee) has power, the trustor is more likely to depend on
the trustee and is motivated to believe that the trustee is trustworthy for achieving the
anticipated benefits of negotiation outcomes. Accordingly, it is likely that trustee power
will exert a positive effect on negotiator trust. In short, the question of how negotiators
can earn their counterpart’s trust, though important to negotiation practice, is not well
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addressed in scientific research. As articulated above, the present study and Kong et al.’s
(2014) meta-analysis together provide some promising starting points for further investi-
gations in this line of inquiry. We have accordingly reflected these variables in the concep-
tual model (Figure 1). We strongly encourage researchers to focus attention on this issue.
Like any other meta-analysis, the current one has limitations worth noting. Caution is
needed in drawing strong conclusions given the small N and k (Oswald & Johnson,
1998). As the literatures on trust and negotiation grow, the present results will need to
be updated. Nevertheless, we believe that the present meta-analysis represents an impor-
tant first step towards organising the currently fragmented literature, building consensus,
and pushing the literature forward (Chan & Arvey, 2012). Second, the proposed conceptual
framework was based on our observation of the current literature, reflecting the collective
wisdom of the community of researchers who have pursued this line of inquiry. Neverthe-
less, the framework may have omitted concepts that have been under-investigated. Future
research can extend our model by including and testing more determining factors. Third,
we urge researchers to replicate the direct relationships identified in the present research
and the detected moderating effect of communication medium using primary data.
Knowledge development in any discipline requires replication work (Hubbard, Vetter, &
Little, 1998; Singh, Ang, & Leong, 2003; Tsang & Kwan, 1999). Yet as Hubbard and Vetter
(1996) noted, compared to accounting, economics, and finance, in which less than 10%
of published empirical work is replication work, management and marketing witness an
even lower percentage (5% or less) of published replication work. With more empirical evi-
dence accumulated, researchers will be able to identify more moderating factors for the
relationships between determining factors and negotiator trust. Fourth, in coding the vari-
ables, we observed considerable heterogeneity in the conceptualisation and measure-
ment of trust in negotiations. Recent meta-analyses on trust consequences in
negotiations suggest that different dimensions of trust may play different roles in nego-
tiations (Kong et al., 2014). When the number of empirical studies grows, it will be valuable
for researchers to further examine whether the type of trust could serve as a moderator of
the relationships between determinants and negotiator trust (similar to Dirks & Ferrin,
2002). Finally, although meta-analyses are an extremely useful tool for quantitatively
cumulating the findings from past research, they are notably weak at providing
evidence on causality. Thus, readers should exercise caution in inferring causality from
our findings.
Concluding remarks
The present meta-analysis addressed a question that is important to both negotiation
scholars and practitioners: What are the determinants of interpersonal trust in dyadic
negotiations? We organised and summarised the currently fragmented literature, propos-
ing an overarching framework. We also proffered the ‘best evidence’ for the bivariate
relationships between trust and its seven determining factors while detecting the moder-
ating effect of FTF vs. CMC medium on the relationship between positive affect and nego-
tiator trust. By taking this initial and exploratory step to enhance the scientific knowledge
of the determinants of negotiator trust, we hope that our findings not only provide valu-
able insight on the current state of the literature for negotiation scholars and practitioners,
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but also serve as a springboard for future research in this important but under-investigated
area.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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Appendix. Summary of independent samples included in the meta-analysis
Article
Trust
definition
Trust variable
category
Label of trust
variable
Alpha of trust
variable
Alpha of trust
determinant
Uncorrected
correlation (r) Sample size Nation
Medium
type
Trust determinant: positive affect
Campagna et al. (2016)
Study 1
PE ABT Benevolence 0.96 0.90 0.64 140 individuals USA CMC
Campagna et al. (2016)
Study 2
PE ABT Benevolence 0.89 0.86 0.30 87 dyads USA CMC
Campagna et al. (2016)
Study 3
PE ABT Benevolence 0.86 0.92 0.34 71 dyads USA CMC
Conlon and Shelton (2002) WTAV GT GT 0.79 0.84 0.18 141 dyads USA FTF
Kong and Bottom (2010) WTAV GT GT 0.63 0.81 −0.12 68 dyads USA FTF
Kong, Tuncel, and McLean
(2011)
WTAV GT GT 0.77 0.90 0.10 79 dyads USA FTF
Kurtzberg, Naquin, and
Belkin (2009)
PE CBT Integrity 0.76 1 0.62 62 dyads USA CMC
Liu and Wang (2010) WTAV GT GT 0.70 0.77 0.22 277 individuals USA Not
applicable
Mislin et al. (2011) Study 1 PE GT GT 0.89 1 0.25 65 dyads USA CMC
Mislin et al. (2011) Study 2 PE CBT GT 0.74 0.87 0.27 127 dyads USA CMC
Morris et al. (2002) PE CBT Integrity 0.90 0.92 0.60 55 dyads USA CMC
Olekalns and Smith (2009) PE CBT Integrity 0.81 1 0.02 60 dyads Australia FTF
Wiltermuth and Neale
(2011) Study 1
WTAV GT GT 1 1 0.61 77 dyads USA FTF
Wiltermuth and Neale
(2011) Study 2
WTAV GT GT 1 1 0.52 70 dyads USA CMC
Trust determinant: negative affect
Bottom et al. (2006) PE ABT Benevolence 0.91 0.78 −0.24 54 dyads USA CMC
Campagna et al. (2016)
Study 1
PE ABT Benevolence 0.96 0.93 −0.36 140 individuals USA CMC
Campagna et al. (2016)
Study 2
PE ABT Benevolence 0.89 0.90 −0.26 87 dyads USA CMC
Campagna et al. (2016)
Study 3
PE ABT Benevolence 0.86 0.89 −0.29 71 dyads USA CMC
Conlon and Shelton (2002) WTAV GT GT 0.79 0.91 −0.40 141 dyads USA FTF
Kong and Bottom (2010) WTAV GT GT 0.63 0.74 −0.08 68 dyads USA FTF
Kong et al. (2011) WTAV GT GT 0.77 0.95 −0.38 79 dyads USA FTF
Liu and Wang (2010) WTAV GT GT 0.70 0.86 −0.26 277 individuals USA Not
applicable
Olekalns and Smith (2009) PE CBT Integrity 0.81 1 −0.03 60 dyads Australia FTF
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Trust determinant: social motives
Olekalns et al. (2002) PE CBT Integrity 0.79 1 0.62 48 dyads (with
confederate)
Australia FTF
Ramírez-Marín, Medina,
and Steinel (2007)
WTAV GT GT 0.89 1 0.21 88 dyads Spain FTF
Srivastava and Chakravarti
(2009)
PE CBT Integrity 0.79 1 0.53 16 dyads USA FTF
Trust determinant: power
Campagna et al. (2010) PE CBT Integrity 1 1 −0.19 30 dyads USA CMC
Wiltermuth and Neale
(2011) Study 1
WTAV GT GT 1 1 0.04 77 dyads USA FTF
Wiltermuth and Neale
(2011) Study 2
WTAV GT GT 1 1 0.05 70 dyads USA CMC
Trust determinant: pre-negotiation relationship
Kong and Bottom (2010) WTAV GT GT 0.63 1 0.18 68 dyads USA FTF
Kwon and Weingart (2008) PE CBT Integrity 0.90 1 0.22 98 dyads USA CMC
Miller et al. (2010) PE CBT Integrity 0.89 0.63 −0.04 84 individuals USA CMC
Morris et al. (2002) PE CBT Integrity 0.90 0.77 0.43 55 dyads USA CMC
Olk and Elvira (2001) PE GT GT 0.77 1 0.17 104 dyads USA FTF
Stevenson (1997) PE GT GT 0.89 1 0.71 37 dyads USA FTF
Zhang et al. (2014) PE CBT Integrity 0.78 1 0.40 130 dyads USA &
China
FTF
Trust determinant: small talk
Bottom et al. (2006) PE ABT Benevolence 0.91 0.80 0.30 54 dyads USA CMC
Mislin et al. (2011) Study 1 PE CBT Integrity 0.74 1 0.41 127 dyads USA CMC
Mislin et al. (2011) Study 2 PE GT GT 0.89 1 −0.07 65 dyads USA CMC
Morris et al. (2002) PE CBT Integrity 0.90 1 0.22 55 dyads USA FTF
Trust determinant: communication medium
Citera, Beauregard, and
Mitsuya (2005)
PE CBT Ability 0.92 1 0.30 70 dyads USA FTF vs. CMC
Naquin and Paulson (2003) PE CBT Integrity 0.70 1 0.74 34 dyads USA FTF vs. CMC
Parlamis and Ames (2010) WTAV GT GT 0.79 1 0.25 54 dyads USA FTF vs. CMC
Trust determinant: national culture
Gunia et al. (2011) Study 1 PE CBT Integrity 0.71 1 0.24 205 individuals US vs.
India
CMC
Gunia et al. (2011) Study 2 PE GT GT 0.86 1 0.21 67 dyads US vs.
India
FTF
(Continued )
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Appendix. Continued.
Article
Trust
definition
Trust variable
category
Label of trust
variable
Alpha of trust
variable
Alpha of trust
determinant
Uncorrected
correlation (r) Sample size Nation
Medium
type
Zhang (2002) PE CBT Integrity 0.71 1 0.55 96 dyads US vs.
China
FTF
Zhang et al. (2014) PE CBT Integrity 0.78 1 0.01 130 dyads US vs.
China
FTF
Note: Trust definition includes the positive expectation (PE) component (McAllister, 1995) and the willingness to accept vulnerability (WTAV) component of the definition by Mayer et al. (1995).
Trust category includes cognition-based trust (CBT), affect-based trust (ABT), and general trust (GT). Detailed trust category includes general trust (GT), and perceived ability, benevolence, and
integrity. FTF = Face-to-face negotiation; CMC = negotiation via computer-mediated communication including email, video conference, etc. Liu and Wang (2010) used a hypothetical negotiation
task, so the medium type was coded as ‘Not applicable’. If a trust determinant was manipulated, its alpha was coded as 1. If a study used a single item measure or did not report the alpha of a
measure, we coded the alpha as 1. If the study reported types of effect size other than correlations, we transformed them into correlation coefficients.
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